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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the eects of land market restrictions on structural change from agriculture to
non-agriculture in a rural economy. We develop a theoretical model that focuses on higher migration costs
due to restrictions on alienability, and identies the possibility of a reverse structural change where the
share of nonagricultural employment declines. The reverse structural change can occur under the following
conditions: if demand for nonagricultural good is income-inelastic (assuming non-farm is nontradable),
or non-agriculture is less labor intensive relative to agriculture (assuming non-farm is tradable). For
identication, we exploit a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where historical malaria played a unique
role in land policy. The empirical evidence indicates signicant adverse eects of land restrictions on
manufacturing and services employment, rural wages, and per capita household consumption. The evidence
on the disaggregated occupational choices suggests that land restrictions increase wage employment in
agriculture, but reduce it in manufacturing and services, with no perceptible eects on selfemployment
in nonagriculture. The results are consistent with a migration costs model, but contradict two widely-
discussed alternative mechanisms: collateral eect, and property rights insecurity. We also provide direct
evidence in favor of the migration costs mechanism.
Key Words: Land Market Restrictions, Structural Change, Agriculture vs. non-farm, Migration Costs,
Labor Market, Non-agricultural Employment, Poverty, Historical Malaria
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1 Introduction
Economic transformation from a predominantly agrarian and rural economy to an industrialized and urban
one is considered a cornerstone of economic development (Matsuyama (2008), Syrquin (1988), Chenery
(1960), Kuznets (1966), Clark (1957)). The classic literature on structural change focused on the long-run
evolution of sectoral shares of agriculture, manufacturing and services in employment and output.2 Recent
studies on structural change in developing countries provide robust evidence that labor productivity in non-
agriculture is signicantly higher than in agriculture. Macmillan and Rodrik (2011) report that productivity
ratio between manufacture and agriculture is on average 2.3 in Africa, 2.8 in Latin America and 3.9 in Asia.
Such large productivity gaps imply that a structural change in favor of non-farm activities (manufacturing
and services) may be desirable for both eciency and poverty alleviation (Macmillan and Rodrik, 2011;
Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh, 2014; Vollrath, 2009).3
It is widely argued that misallocation of labor { reected in persistent dierences in labor productivity
across areas and sectors { results from dualism in the labor market. The source of this dualism can be
traced to formal and informal barriers/restrictions in the labor and land markets (Lewis, 1954; Harris and
Todaro, 1970; Fei and Ranis, 1964, Hayami and Prescott (2008)). In many developing countries, especially
in 1950s and 1960s, dualistic policies were designed to ensure supply of labor at low wages to the urban
manufacturing sector, and to relax the \savings constraint" and \wage goods constraint"; they include the
so-called price-scissors (see Sah and Stiglitz (1987)), and geographic mobility restrictions such as Hukou
in China and Ho Khau in Vietnam. Restrictions on sales of land were a salient feature of the policy
regimes in many countries in Asia and Africa. This paper provides an analysis of the extent to which
formal sales and rental restrictions on agricultural land can constrain employment transition from farm to
non-farm activities in rural areas, and create policy-induced dualism. We provide evidence on the eects of
land restrictions on disaggregated employment choices across ve occupational categories. We also analyze
whether land market restrictions aect per capita consumption in a village adversely.
This paper is related to a growing literature in development economics that examines the economic
2For recent surveys, please see Matsuyama (2008), Herrendorf et al. (2013).
3Gollin et al. (2014) show that the productivity gap between agriculture and nonagriculture cannot be explained by data
quality and measurement problems.
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eects of land market imperfections and restrictions.4 The focus of most of the studies has been on
two mechanisms through which the eects of land restrictions are mediated: insecurity of property rights
(Demsez (1967)), and collateral constraint due to inalienability of land (Feder and Onchan (1987), Feder
et al. (1988), de Soto (2000)). The evidence shows that insecure and nontransferable property rights in
land adversely aects incentives to undertake irreversible long-term investment and productivity (Feder
and Onchan (1987), Besely (1995), Iyer and Do (2008), Holden et al. (2007), Deininger and Jin (2006),
Jacoby et al. (2002)).5 A number of studies nd that improvements in the security of property rights in
land results in increased labor supply to market, as guard labor to protect contestable land rights is not
needed anymore (see Field (2007) on Peru, Iyer and DO (2008) on Vietnam, Iyer et al. (2014) on China).6
Feder et al. (1988), Feder and Feeny (1991) and de Soto(2000) argue that formalization of property rights
in land can potentially create collateral value and improve access to credit, though empirical evidence on
this channel is mixed, at best.7 Hayashi and Prescott (2008) and Emran and Shilpi (2014, 2015) focus on
the migration costs channel; they underscore that sales and rental restrictions can signicantly increase
the costs of migration as a household loses its claim to future income stream from land when it leaves the
village.8 Hayashi and Prescott (2008) show that in prewar Japan informal inheritance custom resulted in
increased rural-urban migration costs, and the resulting misallocation of labor was an important factor in
low productivity. Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming, 2015) nd that as a result of the increased migration
costs, land market restrictions increase female labor force participation and depress both male and female
wages in the rural areas of Sri Lanka.
4For an excellent early survey, see Deininger and Feder (1998).
5Besley (1995) nds that, in Ghana, better land rights encourage investments in tree plantation; Jacoby et al. (2002)
report that farmers invest more in organic fertilizers when the threat of expropriation (land reallocation) is lower in rural
China; Iyer and Do (2008) Show that 1993 land law in Vietnam that made private land rights secure and transferable led to
more investments in perennial industrial and fruit crops. Holden et al. (2007) nd that, in Ethiopia, low cost land certication
increases investment and productivity. Deininger and Jin (2006) report that transfer rights signicantly enhance investment
in Ethiopia.
6Iyer, Meng, Qian and Zhao (2014) nd that transfer of property rights to private households and subsequent removal of
sales restrictions on privately-owned houses in urban areas in China during the 1980s and 1990s increased supply of labor
to private sector jobs. Field (2007) nds that land titling in Peruvian urban slums resulted in substantial increase in labor
hours, a shift from work at home to work outside, and from child to adult labor.
7Besley (1995) does not nd any evidence in Ghana to support the view that land rights enhance collateral value and
access to credit, and Field (2007) fails to nd any signicant impact of land titling in Peruvian slums on access to or use of
credit. Pender and Kerr (1999) report similar ndings for south India, and Iyer and Do (2008) for Vietnam. In a series of
papers on Thailand in late eighties and early nineties, Gershon Feder and his co-authors nd that land titling increases access
to credit and investment when formal banks are important source of credit. For a summary of the evidence and a critique of
the de Soto view, see Haldar and Stiglitz (2013).
8Besley (1995) discusses \gains from trade" as a third mechanism for the eects of land rights, where better rights increase
the land price. Although he does not discuss rural-urban migration, one can interpret part of the `gains from trade' as `gains
from migration'.
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We analyze the eects of land market restrictions on structural change from farm to non-farm sector in
rural areas as measured by employment shares.9 We construct a two-sector model where agricultural pro-
duction requires land and labor, and non-agricultural production uses labor and capital. The inalienability
of land rights because of sales restrictions implies that, in the event of migration, households lose the net
present value of future earnings from land. The increased migration costs lower migration, and thus lead
to higher labor endowment in a location with higher incidence of land restrictions. However, the eects of
land restrictions on the allocation of labor between agriculture and non-agriculture in equilibrium depends
on the tradability of non-agricultural good.10 When non-agriculture is traded beyond the village, the share
of agricultural labor increases in response to imposition of land restrictions under the plausible assumption
that agriculture is more labor intensive. With nontradable non-agricultural product (i.e, traded only in
local market), the local demand plays an important role (Matsuyama (2008)), and a positive impact of
land restrictions on agriculture's labor share is found if demand for non-agriculture is income inelastic. The
assumption that demand for rural non-farm goods and services is inelastic seems plausible, because most
of the goods and services produced in rural non-farm sector are of low quality, and a household substitutes
away from them as income increases.11 The sales restrictions in land markets may thus result in a form of
\reverse structural change" in the rural economy where the labor share in agriculture increases.
It is important to appreciate that the prediction of a \reverse structural change" is not unique to the mi-
gration costs mechanism; it also holds true when the primary mediating channel for the eects of restrictions
is instead collateral value of land. Restrictions on sales and alienability of land can destroy its collateral
value, and restrict a household's access to capital, thus adversely aecting the non-farm entrepreneurship
and expansion of non-farm businesses. An important advantage of our theoretical framework is its ability
to distinguish between migration and other channels. If migration cost is the main mechanism driving the
9The eects on land market restrictions on structural change has been largely ignored in the literature, with the notable
exception of Hayashi and Prescott (2008). To the best of our knowledge, there is no analysis of the eects of policy restrictions
in the land market on structural change in a rural economy that tries to disentangle three alternative causal mechanisms
discussed above. In the context of Vietnam's land titling program, Iyer and Do (2008) nd that households in provinces with
more private land titles devote more time to non-farm activities, but they do not discuss whether this leads to structural
change. Deininger et al. (2014) nd that, in China, higher proportion of land certicates at the village level increases labor
allocation to nonfarm activities. The focus in this paper is on the occupational choices (rather than time allocation); we
estimate how the primary occupation of an individual changes in response to land market restrictions.
10We assume that agricultural good is internationally tradable, which seems appropriate given that rice is the most important
crops in Sri Lanka.
11Unfortunately, we are not aware of any credible estimates of income elasticity of demand for non-agricultural goods
produced in the village. Part of the challenge is that most of the surveys do not identify the goods purchased by a household
in terms of their location of production.
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intersectoral reallocation of labor, then our model predicts lower wages in areas with higher incidence of
land restrictions. In contrast, wage rate will remain largely unaected by land restrictions if either credit
constraint or insecurity of property requiring guard labor is important (assuming no change in migration
costs, and no policy restrictions on rural-urban labor mobility).
To provide evidence on the eects of land market restrictions on occupational choices, we follow Emran
and Shilpi (forthcoming, 2015) and exploit a historical quasi-experiment in Sri Lanka where the cross-
section variations in the incidence of land restrictions across dierent sub-districts (i.e., proportion of land
under policy restrictions) were primarily determined by historical malaria prevalence through its eects
on `crown land'.12 Historical malaria caused exodus from the aected areas, and the land abandoned by
the households was nationalized by the colonial government and designated as crown land. The crown
land was later distributed through settlements after independence, and restrictions on sales, mortgage and
rental were imposed by the government.13 This created a positive correlation between historical malaria
incidence and the incidence of land restrictions in an area through the availability of crown land. We
use this positive correlation between historical malaria and incidence of land restrictions in a sub-district
to identify the causal eects of land restrictions on structural change in the rural economy. As noted in
Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming), the strength of the identication strategy derives partly from the following
observations: (i) a successful nationwide malaria eradication program was implemented in Sri Lanka in
1947; malaria endemicity fell close to zero by 1950-51.14 Historical malaria estimate from 1937-41 is used
in this paper to identify the eects of land market restrictions in 2002 (survey year for our data), (ii)
the timing of the malaria eradication program was determined by technological breakthrough (DDT), and
thus can be treated as plausibly exogenous,15 and (iii) most of the current population in a subdistrict
devastated by high historical malaria were never exposed to historical malaria there, as they were resettled
from other relatively malaria free regions;16 (iv) unlike some countries such as China (Hukou), Vietnam
12We use the data on malaria endemicity at the district level for 1937-41 compiled by Newman (1965). Emran and Shilpi
(forthcoming, 2015) exploit historical malaria incidence to analyze the eects of land restrictions on male and female wages,
and women's labor force participation.
13Over time, restrictions on mortgage have been relaxed when dealing with public banks.
14Malaria endemicity is measured by enlarged spleen rates. Reported malaria cases in Sri Lanka were reduced from about
3 million per year during pre-eradication era to only 29 in 1964 (Harrison, 1978). The number of malaria death cases were 30
in 2002 among a population of 21 million. The reported malaria death were 4 in 2003, and 0 in 2005.
15Although DDT was rst synthesized in 1874, its insecticidal properties were discovered in 1939 by Swiss scientist Paul
H Muller. It was widely used during second World War to control malaria and typhus, and after the war DDT was made
available as an agricultural pesticide and for malaria eradication programs.
16This observation extremely important as it implies that health, education, attitude etc. of the current generation living in
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(Ho Khau), and Ethiopia, there are no geographic mobility restrictions or other policies that tie households
to a village in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is thus an excellent case study to understand the eects of sales and
rental restrictions in the rural land market, as the eects of land market restrictions are not confounded
by the eects of other related policies.17 We discuss a number of potential objections to the identication
strategy and provide evidence on its credibility in section 3 below.
The empirical results show that land restrictions reduce the probability of participation in non-agriculture
signicantly: a one percentage point increase in land restrictions reduces probability of participation in
non-agriculture by 1.38 percent.18 Land market restrictions thus hold back structural change from agri-
culture to non-agriculture in a rural economy. The more disaggregated analysis using a multinomial logit
model indicates that land restrictions have negative and statistically signicant eects on the probability
of wage employment in manufacturing and services activities, with a particularly large eect on services
employment.19 In contrast, there is a positive eect on the probability of being employed in agricultural
wage work. The probability of self-employment in the non-agricultural activity, however, does not change
signicantly with an increase in land under restrictions suggesting an absence of a collateral and credit
eect. The instrumental variable regression for wages conrms that land restrictions aect local wage
adversely, and lower per capita household consumption in a village. Earlier results in the context of Sri
Lanka also show that land restrictions aect wages negatively, for both men and women (Emran and Shilpi
(forthcoming, 2015)). The evidence thus rejects the collateral or insecure property rights channels, and
highlights the importance of migration costs, as emphasized by Hayashi and Prescott (2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the main conceptual framework for
the empirical estimation. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy adopted in the paper for identication
and estimation of the eects of land market restrictions on wages. Section 4 provides a description of the
LDO lands (i.e., surveyed in 2002) cannot be aected by historical malaria in any signicant way. For a complete discussion
including direct evidence, please see section (3) below.
17For example, the Hukou system in China controlled rural urban migration with a web of restrictions that span employment,
education, and marriage. Moving to urban areas without an urban Hukou would mean that a family would lose grain rations,
the land, and the children will not be able to attend schools in urban areas. Although over the years, Hukou restrictions
have been relaxed in some provinces, it is dicult to treat these changes as exogeneous, as they are partly determined by the
economic changes in a province. A signicant part of the existing literature focuses on China, Vietnam, and Ethiopia.
18The nonagriculture comprises of three categories of employment: self employment in non-farm, wage employment in
manufacturing, and wage employment in services, and the agriculture includes both agricultural self-employment and wage
employment.
19In multinomial logit model, we treat self-employment in agriculture as the omitted category. We use a control function
approach to instrumental variables estimation for multinomial logit.
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data. Empirical results are presented in section 5. The paper ends with a concise summary of the results
in conclusion.
2 Conceptual framework
We set-up a simple model to understand the possible eects of land restrictions on employment pattern
in a rural economy. To develop the intuitions regarding the impacts of land restrictions, we consider a
two-sector economy producing food (f) and non-agriculture or non-farm good (n). We assume that food is
internationally traded and its price is normalized to 1. The results depend on whether the non-farm good
is tradable or nontradable (beyond the village), which is consistent with a substantial literature on the role
of domestic demand in structural change when preference is non-homothetic (see the survey by Matsuyama
(2008)). For simplicity, land is assumed to be used only in food production and capital in non-agricultural
production. Both activities require labor in the production process. Denoting land as T and capital as K
, the production functions for dierent activities are:
Qf = (T )
  
Lf
1 
for agriculture
Qnk = (K)

(Ln)
1 
) for nonagricultural goods and services
The utility function for a consumer is assumed to be of Stone-Geary form:
Uk = Uk(C
f ; Cn) = f ln(C
f   f ) + n ln(Cn   n) (1)
where Cf and Cn are consumption of food and non-agricultural good respectively, and f and n are
subsistence quantities of food and nonagricultural good respectively. This specication allows for Engel
curve eect, with the homothetic utility function as a special case where f =n = 0. The budget constraint
can be written as:
Cf + PnCn = Y
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where Pn is the relative price of non-agricultural good and Y is the total income.
The demand functions for food and non-agriculture can be derived as:
Cj = j +
j
P j
[Y   f   nPn] where j = f; n, and P f = 1 (2)
Households dier in terms of land; household h with Th  0 amount of land. Access to credit (capital)
required for non-farm activities depend on the amount of land a household can oer as collateral. To keep
the model simple, we assume that a household h can get Kh = Th amount of capital. Denote aggregate
land and capital in the village by T and K respectively. To focus on the collateral role of land and credit
constraint in the non-farm sector, we adopt the simplifying assumption that  is low enough so that the
household with the most land is credit constrained at the initial equilibrium without land restrictions20
In this model, a collateral eect of land restrictions a la de Soto (1989) is represented as a lower value of
. Labor is assumed to be mobile across locations and migration across locations is costly. We assume
that households face heterogeneous migration costs ' (dh) in the absence of land restrictions, where dh is
the distance of household h from the urban labor market, and can be interpreted as a summary measure
of all types of migration costs related to the geographic location of a household. Under land restrictions
(transport costs, social costs, amenities etc.), a household with LDO land loses the rent on land when it
decides to migrate out of the village. The migration costs are thus higher when a household is in LDO
settlement, and has higher amount of land, and also lives in a village further from the urban center:
The important implication of higher migration costs due to land restrictions is that many households nd
it optimal not to migrate because of the loss of land, and the eective labor endowment in a village increases
as a result. Under the assumption that land restrictions have no eect on credit availability (i.e.,  remains
same after the imposition of restrictions), land restrictions lower equilibrium wage as more households stay
back in the village and supply of labor increases. The equilibrium wage is determined by local labor market
clearing coupled with a rural-urban migration condition (spatial arbitrage condition in the labor market).
For a complete discussion on the wage determination and the eects of restrictions, please see Appendix
20This is similar to the assumption of Feder and Feeny (1991). We, however, note that the central results in this paper
remain valid in a more general model where some households have enough land so that they are not credit constrained for
their investment in the non-farm sector. For an alternative model where the collateral value aects the interest rate, please
see Besley (1995).
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A.21 However, the intuition behind the result that land restrictions reduce equilibrium wage in local labor
market can be seen readily from the migration equilibrium condition. Denote the indirect utility function
is rural and urban areas as V r (:) and V u (:), we can write the migration equilibrium condition at the initial
equilibrium (without restrictions):
V u (Th0 ; w
u; 1; Pn)  ' (dh0) = V r
 
Th0 ; w
0; 1; Pn

(3)
So at the initial equilibrium all households located at a distance higher than a threshold dh > dh0 decide not
to migrate. The important point in equation (3) for our analysis is that the land endowment a household
has as a rural resident appears also in the urban indirect utility function as they can sell the land and
take the money with them. The land restrictions implies that the indirect utility for a migrant household
becomes: V u (0; wu; 1; Pn) where the land is set equal to zero because they lose the land. Thus we have
V u (0; wu; 1; Pn) < V u (Th; w
u; 1; Pn). This implies from equation (3) that all households at location
dh0with positive land endowment will nd it undesirable to migrate because they lose the land. The labor
supply in the village market increases as a result and the equilibrium wage declines.
Case 1: Nonagricultural Sector Produces Tradable Goods
In this section, we consider the case when the non-farm good is also tradable along with the agricultural
good, and thus the prices of both consumer goods can be normalized to 1. In this model, local demand
(village income) does not play any role in the eects of land restrictions on intersectoral labor allocation.
Denote the initial equilibrium wage rate (without restrictions) in the local labor market by w0, and the
wage rate following imposition of land restrictions as w < w0.
Given a wage rate w, the relative share of labor in non-farm sector in the village can be expressed as:
Snf =
Ln
Lf
=

(1  )1= K
(1  )1= T

w( )= (4)
21In dierent models, Emran and Shilpi (2015, forthcoming) also show that land market restrictions lead to lower wages
under plausible conditions when migration cost is the relevant channel.
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Proposition 1: Under the assumptions that both food and non-food are traded goods, the imposition of
land restrictions increases local labor supply and decreases local wage due to higher migration costs. The
allocation of labor to food production increases relative to that to non-food production if labor's share in
food production is higher than that in non-food production [(1   ) > (1   )]:
The proof of the second part of proposition 1 follows directly from equation (4), by noting that
@Snf
@w
> 0
if  > , and from the fact that land restrictions reduce the equilibrium wage in the village (see appendix
A for the eects on equilibrium wage).22 As labor share in agriculture is found to be much larger (more
than 70%) compared to non-agricultural production (below 30%) in developing countries, the imposition
of land restrictions is thus likely to lead to an increase in labor share in food/agricultural production, thus
holding back the structural change in the village .
Equation (4) can also be used to derive the implications of collateral constraints due to land restrictions.
If restrictions on land sales reduce (or destroy) the collateral value resulting in a lower , the aggregate
capital in the non-farm sector declines ( K in equation (4) is lower). It follows from equation (4) that the
ratio of employment in non-farm to agriculture decreases as a result even if there is no change in wages.
Thus if one nds that land restrictions reduce employment in no-farm sector, it does not shed light on
whether the eects are due to increased migration costs or due to tightening credit constraints. However, it
is possible to identify the channel which is primarily responsible for the observed impacts of land restrictions
if one considers both employment pattern and wages. A decrease in capital due to land restrictions reduces
demand for labor in non-food production, resulting in a decline in local wage. Such wage decline will induce
out-migration reducing labor supply to the village labor market, and thus restoring the the rural-urban
labor market arbitrage condition. In the new equilibrium, the local wage rate will remain unaected if
migration costs are not aected by the imposition of land restrictions.
Note that insecurity of property rights will induce households to keep someone on the premise to guard
against theft and expropriation, reducing labor supply and increasing local wage. Again if labor is mobile,
then this will induce more in-migration and push the wage down to initial equilibrium wage. In contrast
to both of these cases, an increase in migration costs (and no change in borrowing constraint) will increase
22That higher land restrictions result in lower wages in a village was established, both theoretically and empirically, in Emran
and Shilpi (forthcoming). The theoretical model in Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming) is, however, substantially dierent from
the model developed in this paper.
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labor supply and reduce local wage. The empirical analysis in this paper relies on this insight to distinguish
between migration, property right insecurity and borrowing channels.
Case 2: Nonfarm good is a Non-tradable
The theoretical model discussed above takes non-agricultural output as a tradable good, and as a result,
the village income (local demand) does not play any role in the structural change. Most non-farm activities
including some manufacturing rms in rural areas, however, cater to local demand, and their products and
services are non-tradable beyond the connes of the village market. As noted before, when the nonagricul-
tural good is a nontradable, the eects of higher migration costs on intersectoral labor allocation depends
on the underlying assumptions about the income elasticity of demand. With Stone-Geary utility function,
income elasticity of demand can range from inelastic to elastic by varying the subsistence quantities. For
instance, if f = 0 and n > 0, then income elasticity of nonagricultural good is less than unity. If f = 0
and n = 0; then utility function represents homothetic preference and income elasticities of both goods are
equal to unity. In contrast, f > 0 and n = 0 implies an elastic income response for nonagricultural goods.
The equilibrium is now characterized by market clearing in nonagricultural goods market (n market), in
addition to market clearing in the village market and the rural-urban migration equilibrium conditions (for
details, please see appendix A).
We rst consider the case where income elasticity of non-farm goods demand is greater than 1, and set
f > 0 and n = 0 in the demand functions in equation (1). The share of non-farm employment in the
village can be expressed as :
Snf =
n(1  )
(1  n)(1  )

1  
fw(1 )=
(1  )1 = T

(5)
Equation (5) can be used to examine the impact of land restrictions on the share of nonagricultural
employment in the village. From equation (5), it is seen easily that
@Snf
@w < 0: Since land restrictions
lower the equilibrium wage (equation (3) above), we thus expect that the share of non-farm employment
will increase following imposition of restrictions in this case. Note also that if f = 0; the utility function
becomes homothetic (Cobb-Douglas in this case). In this homothetic case, it follows from equation (5) that
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@Snf
@w = 0: In other words, with homothetic preference, the relative employment shares of nonagriculture
and agriculture remains unaected by land restrictions.
When the demand for non-agricultural good is income inelastic, we set .f = 0 and n > 0 in the
demand equations (1) above. In this case, it is not possible to derive a closed form solution for the share
of non-farm employment in a village as a function of the equilibrium wage. As we show in appendix A, the
response of the share of non-farm employment in the village can be expressed as below:
@Snf
@w
=
(1  ) z2
(1 )
(1 ) snf   z1
> 0 (6)
where z1 =
Pnnw(1 )=
(1 )1 = T and z2 =
z1Snf
w
. It is easy to check that the denominator in the right hand side
of equation (6) is positive (see appendix A). As we discussed before, land restrictions lower the equilibrium
wage in the village, which implies from equation (6) that land restrictions result in a contraction of the
non-farm share of employment. We collect the above results in proposition (2) below. For a more complete
treatment of the results, please see appendix A.
Proposition 2: Under the assumption that agricultural good is tradable but nonagricultural good is non-
tradable, the eects of imposition of land restrictions on labor allocation depends on the income elasticity
of demand for nonagricultural good. The imposition of land restrictions leads to a decline (an increase) in
the share of nonagriculture in total employment if the income elasticity of demand for non-farm good is
smaller (greater) than 1.
3 Estimating Equations and Empirical Strategy
To test the hypotheses regarding the eect of land restrictions on employment pattern, we utilize a simple
employment choice model at the individual level. Suppose an individual i can choose from a set of J
dierent employment options (j = 1; 2:::J) at location k. Individual i will choose activity j if:
Uijk = Uimk for all j 6= m
where uijk is the utility derived from being engaged in activity j at location k. We further specify the
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utility function as:
Uijk = U(yjk; Zijk; "ijk)
where yjk is the wage/income in activity j and location k, Zijk is a vector of observed individual
characteristics, and "ijk is the individual specic error term. Following McFadden(1981), we assume that
utility uijk can be approximated by a linear specication:
Uijk = 0 + 1yjk + 2Zijk + "ijk (7)
Utilizing the migration equilibrium condition in equation (3) above, wage/income can be specied as:
yjk = 0 + 1k + 2dku + Z
0
ik  + ik (8)
Where ik is the error term..
Substituting income from equation (8), we have:
Uijk = 0 + 1k + 2dkh + 5Zijk + ijk (9)
Under the assumption that ijk follows an iid logit distribution, equation (9) can be estimated using
the standard multinomial logit formulation.
The main challenge in the estimation of equation (9) is that areas may dier systematically in observed
and unobserved dimensions, and when the unobserved characteristics are correlated with the incidence of
land restrictions, it may lead to signicant omitted variables bias. The most important sources of omitted
variables bias are unobserved labor and land productivity heterogeneity as they are rst order determinants
of labor demand and wages.
5.1 Sources of Bias
Many governments impose restrictions on sales and rental of land in settlement areas (as is the case
in Sri Lanka), and settlement usually takes place in the low quality marginal land.23 When we observe
23However, in many countries such as China, Vietnam, and Ethiopia the land policy is national in scope, and there is little
if any variation in the restrictions imposed across regions.
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land under private property rights to coexist with land under government restrictions, the land under
restrictions is thus likely to be of lower quality.24
A second important issue is human capital heterogeneity. Since lands under policy restrictions in Sri
Lanka are mainly settlement lands, one might worry that the people who had settled there are of lower
productivity due to adverse human capital characteristics. Such negative labor productivity can give rise
to a negative correlation between incidence of land restrictions and wages. Fortunately, Sri Lanka seems a
non-standard case: all of the available evidence shows that land and labor productivity is higher in areas
under land policy restrictions in Sri Lanka, as we discuss below.
To provide evidence on productivity dierences, we analyze crop yield which is an excellent summary
statistic for land and labor productivity of an area. Table 1 reports regressions of crop yields on proportion
of land under restrictions while controlling for rainfall, slope and a dummy indicating whether a DSD is
located within 5 kilometer (km) of a river. The yields are higher in land under restrictions for a number
of crops including rice, the main crop in Sri Lanka (please see Table 1 for details).25 Moreover, there is
no evidence of unfavorable health conditions in areas with high land restrictions; if anything, the evidence
indicates advantages in favor of the LDO areas in terms of health status of the population. The correlations
of incidence of land restrictions with the incidence of chronic illness and disability and percentage of non-
pregnant women suering from dierent degrees of anemia are statistically insignicant (please see Table
2).26 The observed parity in land and labor productivity in areas under land restrictions is the outcome
of Sri Lanka government's heavy investment in irrigation development in resettled areas, and in health,
education.
An additional source of bias in the OLS estimates is possible measurement error in the land restrictions
variable. Both land and labor productivity advantages of land under restrictions and measurement errors
24A related issue is that land restrictions may aect incentives to invest in land improvements including irrigation, and if
the high land restrictions areas are also areas with low irrigation, a negative eect of land restrictions may primarily reect
a lack of irrigation, rather than higher mobility costs. Note, however, that such dierences in land investments is part of
the causal eects of land restrictions, although the channel is dierent from the mobility costs arising from land restrictions
emphasized in this paper. We provide evidence below that the concern that the high land restrictions areas suer from low
irrigation investment is unfounded.
25There is similar positive correlation between `potential' yields of most major crops and proportion of land under restric-
tions, where potential yields are determined by soil quality, soil moisture, rainfall, temperature and other climatic variables
assuming an ideal amount of labor is applied. The results from these regressions are omitted for the sake of brevity and are
available from the authors.
26Only in the case of mild or moderate and severe anemia, the correlation is statistically signicant at 10 percent level, but
the sign is negative implying better health in subdistricts with more land under LDO restrictions.
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imply that we would expect the OLS estimates of the eects of land restrictions on equilibrium wages to be
biased toward zero. Thus simple OLS regressions may not be able to detect the eects of land restrictions
(Emran and Shilpi (2015)).
5.2 Historical Malaria as a Natural Experiment
Malaria infestation played a unique role in the history of land policy in Sri Lanka. The spatial variations
in historical malaria thus oers us an exogenous source of variations in the incidence of land restrictions.
The areas aected by historical malaria endemicity from 13th century to early twentieth century witnessed
exodus of population and large scale abandonment of land (De Silva, 1981). The abandoned land was taken
over by the colonial government and designated as `crown land'. The crown land was later distributed after
the independence in 1948 under Land Development Ordinance of 1935, and restrictions on sales, mortgage,
and rental were imposed (henceforth called LDO restrictions). Since the amount of crown land available
in an area was historically determined by the intensity of malaria, the historical malaria incidence created
exogenous variation in the incidence of land restrictions; the proportion of land under restrictions is higher
in an area, the higher was the intensity of historical malaria prevalence during 13th-18th century.
In the regressions, we control for a number of area characteristics that can potentially be correlated
with both malaria incidence and land productivity, resulting in omitted variables bias. For example, rainfall
is among the most reliable predictors of incidence of malaria in Sri Lanka (Briet et al., 2008). Rainfall
also has direct eect on land productivity.27 In addition to rainfall, regressions control for slope (steeper
slope means less standing water and less malaria), a dummy indicating whether the DSD is within 5 km
of a river, and current incidence of malaria. We discuss additional evidence that provides strong support
to the conclusion that the identication scheme developed based on historical malaria incidence is not
compromised by land and labor productivity dierences.
5.3 Potential Objections to Identication Strategy
As noted in the introduction, there are a number possible objections to our identication scheme that
exploits the positive correlation between historical malaria incidence and land restrictions across dierent
sub-districts in Sri Lanka.
Perhaps the most immediate objection that comes to the mind of a reader familiar with the large
27This is true even with well-developed irrigation, because the marginal cost of rain water is zero, while the marginal cost
of irrigation water is positive and likely upward sloping.
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literature on colonial institutions across countries following Acemoglu et al. (2001) is that historical malaria
might have aected the quality of property rights institutions through its inuence on settler mortality.
However, the long-term eects of malaria on the quality of institutions emphasized in the literature are not
relevant for our identication scheme as identication in our case comes from variations across districts.
The relevant institutions such as legal system, labor market regulations, and enforcement of contracts and
property rights, however, are determined at the national level, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) results also
relevant for cross-country dierences in institutional quality.28 As a conservative strategy, we control for
the proportion of Sinhalese population in a sub-district as a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
that can potentially aect public goods provision.29 A related worry is that historical malaria might have
aected human capital of current labor force adversely in our sample. There are good reasons to believe
that this concern is unfounded. First, and probably the most important, is the fact that the settlement
schemes brought in people from relatively malaria free regions to the subdistricts which were abandoned
because of historical malaria starting from 13th century. As a result, the vast majority of the current
population (or their parents) were never exposed to historical malaria in the sub-district of their current
residence (i.e, residence in 2002). Second, we exclude the cohorts that were potentially exposed (in utero
or post-natal) to historical malaria in Sri Lanka.30 Thus our sample is not contaminated by the possibility
that someone might have been exposed to historical malaria before his/her mother resettled in a subdistrict
of high historical malaria incidence.31
The important implication of the above discussion is that historical malaria in a sub-district cannot be
correlated with the health outcomes of most of the current population. Indeed evidence in Table 2 conrms
that the historical malaria is not correlated with the current health conditions (measured by anemia and
chronic illness/disability). To allay the concern that historical malaria might pick up the current malaria
infections, we control for recent malaria incidence (both Plasmodium Vivax and Plasmodium Falciparum
infection rates).
28It is important to appreciate that labor regulations are not likely to be relevant for our analysis, because we focus on
rural labor markets where there is virtually no labor regulation in Sri Lanka.
29Note, however, that there is no evidence that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with the incidence of land
restrictions across sub-districts in Sri Lanka. A regression of proportion of land under restrictions on a constant and share
of Sinhalese population yields a coecient close to zero (-0.002) with a very low t statistic (-0.33).
30Since malaria exposure in utero can have eects on adult health and education, we exclude cohorts born before 1950,
even though nationwide malaria eradication was implemented in 1947.
31Note that the probability of such exposure is very low as malaria endemicity was much lower in the sub-districts from
where the people were resettled.
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5.4 A Control Function Approach
The dependent variables in our analysis are discrete indicating the probability of participation in non-
agricultural activities. This requires an approach to instrument variable (IV) estimation which diers from
the standard 2SLS regression. To correct for the omitted variable bias, we implement the control function
approach developed for the discrete choice models (Blundell and Powell (2001), and Petrin and Train(2009)
for multinomial logit model, and Rivers and Voung (1988) for probit model). According to this approach,
the discrete choice instrumental variables model is estimated in two steps. First, the endogenous variable
is regressed on exogenous instrument(s) and all other regressors in the model. Second, the multinomial
logit/probit regression is then estimated by including the residual from the above rst-stage regression as
an extra variable (i.e., the control function term). To account for any non-linearity in the distribution, we
follow the literature and include higher order terms of the residual from the rst stage regression.
4 Data
The main data source for the estimation of employment choices is the Household Income and Expenditure
Survey, 2002 (HIES, 2002). The survey collected information from a nationally representative sample of
16,924 households drawn from 1913 primary sampling units. The survey covered 17 of Sri Lanka's 25
districts, and 249 of its 322 Divisional Secretariat Divisions (DSDs).32 The DSD identier in the HIES
(2002) allows us to examine the employment and wages pattern at a much disaggregated geographical
level. To dene our sample, we use three criteria: (i) we exclude age groups which may have been exposed
to historical malaria that aicted Sri Lanka before 1947; and (ii) we focus on the rural sample where
at least 0.1 percent of total land are under restrictions; and (iii) we focus on the male sample to avoid
complications from changes in labor force participation decision which is relevant for women. The number
of adult male who are employed and were born after 1947 and are currently residing in rural areas is 9,702.
Our main estimation is based on a conservative sample of 8,948 individuals who were born after 1950,
though robustness checks were performed for the full sample of 9,702 individuals born after 1947.
A central variable for our analysis is the amount of land under LDO restrictions in a DSD. We draw
32Data collection in the North and Eastern provinces was not possible due to on-going civil conicts at the time of survey
eld work.
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this information from the Agricultural Census of 1998. We estimated percentage of agricultural land under
LDO leases (including permits and grants). The geographic information including travel time from surveyed
DSDs to major urban centers with population of 100 thousand or more are drawn from the Geographical
Information System (GIS) database. The travel time is estimated using the existing road network and
allowing dierent travel speed on dierent types of roads.
The most important variable for our instrumental variables analysis is the historical district level malaria
prevalence (endemicity) rate. The data on historical malaria prevalence are taken from Newman (1965).
The measure for malaria prevalence used in this paper is called Gabaldon's endemicity index (see column 2
in Table 4, P.34, Newman, 1965). This index is based on the estimates of enlarged spleens in children due
to malaria, and is a good indicator of the degree to which malaria is high and permanent in a district. The
HIES 2002 has complete employment, education, age, gender, ethnicity and religion. Summary statistics
of all variables used in the analysis are provided in appendix Table A.1.
In both farming and non-farm activities, a considerable share of those employed are self employed. In the
empirical analysis, we thus make a distinction among 5 dierent types of employment. The main categories
of employment considered are self employment in agriculture (farming), wage employment in agriculture,
self employment in non-agriculture, wage employment in manufacturing sector and wage employment in
services. The analysis of HIES shows that among 8,948 adult male in the labor force, 14 percent are
farmers, 18 percent are agricultural wage laborers, 17 percent employed in manufacturing, 37 percent in
services and 14 percent as self-employed in non-agriculture (Table A.1).
5 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis of structural change focuses on two dierent dependent variables: one representing
the broader choice of agriculture versus non-agriculture, and the other making a distinction among ve
dierent types of employment choices (self employment in farming, and in non-agriculture, and wage
employment in agriculture, manufacturing and services). The dependent variable in the more disaggregated
employment choice regression is an unordered categorical variable indicating sector of employment of
individual labor force participants (with self-employment in agriculture as the omitted category). The
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regressors include a set of individual and area characteristics. As individual level controls, we include
education, age (as a measure of experience and cohort eect), marital status dummy and ethnicity/religion
dummies.33 The marital status may capture some dierences in motivation and preference.
We control for travel time to large urban cities which is an important determinant of migration costs in a
village. This variable also captures eects of dierential access to infrastructure and services across areas.34
As noted before, the area-specic regressors include controls for disease environment, and land and labor
productivity indicators. All standard errors are clustered at sub-district (DSD) level. The disaggregated
employment choices are estimated by a multinomial logit model.
5.1 Employment Choices and Land Restrictions: Preliminary Estimates
We start with the probit regression for employment choice between non-agriculture and agriculture. The
dependent variable in this regression takes the value of one if an individual is employed in non-agricultural
activities and zero otherwise. The probit coecients and the marginal eects evaluated at the mean of all
variables are presented in the rst column of Table 3. The coecient of proportion of land under restrictions
has a negative sign and is statistically signicant at the 1 percent. The estimate of marginal eect implies
that a one percentage point increase in land under restrictions decreases the probability of participation
in non-agricultural activities by about 0.53 percent. This is consistent with the prediction of proposition 1
when both farm and non-farm products are traded, and labor share in non-agricultural output is less than
that in agriculture. This result is also consistent with prediction of proposition 2 when non-agricultural
goods are non-traded and face an income inelastic demand. To see if the result for overall non-agricultural
employment holds also at disaggregate level particularly when a distinction is made between traded and
non-traded non-agricultural goods, we turn to results from multinomial logit regressions.
The results from simple multinomial logit regression (without control function terms) are reported in
columns 2-5 of Table 3. The estimates of coecients of land under restrictions show that an increase
in proportion of land under restrictions decreases the log-odd of participation in all types of activities
33The omitted category for the ethnicity (religion) dummies is Sinhalese. About 84 percent of Sri Lanka's population are
Sinhalese.
34Dierential access to markets, other infrastructure and services is less of a concern in the context of Sri Lanka. The country
invested heavily on providing equitable access to infrastructure and services to its citizens regardless of their residence. For
instance, the country has 1 kilometer (km) of road per 1 square km of area and 5 km of road per 1000 inhabitants. There is
a government run hospital within 5 km, and primary school within 3 km of a typical household.
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including wage labor in agriculture. The logit coecients are all statistically signicant at 1 percent level.
The logit results imply that the extra labor endowment in a village due to imposition of land restrictions
is absorbed mostly in self employment in agriculture compared with all other activities.
The multinomial logit coecients in Table 3 do not reect the way probability of participation in an
activity responds to a change in land restrictions. To measure the magnitudes of these responses, we
estimate the marginal eects (evaluated at the mean) which are reported in the upper part of each panel in
Table 3. The estimates of the marginal eects in the rst panel show that the probability of participation
in all types of non-farm activities decreases with an increase in the percentage of land under restrictions.
Land restrictions have opposite eects on the probability of participation in self and wage employment in
agriculture. The marginal eect is precisely estimated for dierent types of wage employment.
The main conclusion that emerges from Table 3 is that agriculture absorbs a disproportionate share
of the increased labor supply resulting from land restrictions. The estimates of coecients of land under
restriction could however be biased if unobserved land and labor productivity heterogeneity is correlated
with proportion of land under restrictions. In the following subsection, we tackle this omitted variable bias
using a control function approach.
5.2 Employment Choices and Land Restrictions: Control Function Results
As noted earlier in the empirical strategy section (3), a control function is needed to be included to
correct for the possible omitted variable biases in the probit and multinomial logit estimates. The control
function term is dened from the residuals of the rst stage regression where the endogenous variable
(proportion of land under restrictions) is regressed on the instrument and rest of the regressors in the
model. Panel A of Table 4 shows the control function estimates of the eects of land restrictions on
employment probabilities, and panel B reports the rst stage regressions and diagnostics for the strength
of the instrument. According to the rst stage result in panel B, the instrument has the expected positive
sign and is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level; higher historical malaria in 1935 led to higher
incidence of land restrictions. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistics is 24.50 which is more than twice the Stock-
Yogo critical value of 9.08 for 10 percent maximal relative IV bias. This conrms that the instrument has
excellent strength to identify the eects of land restrictions. The control function term is dened from the
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residual of this rst stage regression. To account for possible nonlinearity, we also include square and cubic
terms of the residual as additional control function terms.
The estimates from the control function approach are reported in the upper panel of Table 4. The control
function terms are jointly signicant at the 5 percent or less level in probit regression as well as for all
options in the multinomial logit regression. This result conrms that unobserved heterogeneity is important
in determining the substitution probability across alternative activities. The linear term of the control
function has a positive sign in all regressions and options. The positive sign of the control function term
justies the worry that unobserved heterogeneity causes downward bias in the simple probit/multinomial
logit coecients.
The inclusion of the control function terms in the probit regression of propensity to participate in
non-agricultural activities increases the magnitude of land restrictions coecient (column 1, Table 4). The
estimated coecient indicates that an increase in land under restrictions reduces the log-odds of participa-
tion in non-farm activities. The marginal eect estimated at the mean of all explanatory variables shows
that an increase in land under restrictions by 1 percentage point decreases the probability of participation
in non-farm activities by 1.38 percent.
The control function estimation results for the multinomial logit model are reported in columns 2-5 of
Table 4. The results conrm the negative impact of land restrictions on the log-odds of participation in all
types of non-farm activities, and in agricultural wage labor (compared to selfemployment in agriculture).
However, the eects on log-odds do not lend to easy interpretation, thus we look at the marginal eects.
The marginal eects estimated at the mean of all explanatory variables show that land restrictions have
negative and statistically signicant eects on the probability of being employed in the manufacturing and
services activities. The employment share of services declines the most: a percentage point increase in
land under restrictions decreases probability of being employed in services by 0.71 percent. However, the
marginal eect estimate suggests a positive eect of land restrictions on the probability of being employed
in agricultural wage work. The probability of being employed as a self-employed in the non-agricultural
activity on the other hand does not change signicantly with an increase in land under restrictions at least
at the mean of all explanatory variables.
Among dierent types of non-agricultural activities, manufacturing is more likely to be traded and ser-
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vices non-traded. The multinomial logit results indicate that employment shares of both of these activities
decline in areas with higher proportion of land under restrictions. As the labor share of manufacturing
output is signicantly lower than that of agriculture, the decline in relative share of manufacturing em-
ployment is consistent with the prediction of proposition 1. The result for services on the other hand is
consistent with the case where demand for local services is income inelastic (proposition 2). The result
for self employment in non-agriculture however casts doubt on the credit channel through which land re-
strictions may aect employment. Access to capital is more important for self employment and should
reduce in employment in this category. Contrary to this expectation, we nd no signicant impact of land
restrictions on the propensity to become self-employment. We checked if the estimated marginal eects of
land restriction on probability of self-employment is statistically signicant along the entire distribution of
proportion of land under restrictions.35 The estimates conrm the result estimated at the mean value of
land restrictions: none of the marginal eects are statistically signicant for self employment.
5.3 Robustness Checks for the Eects on the Pattern of Employment
In this subsection, we present results from several robustness checks. The results from the robustness
checks are reported in Table 5. To reduce clutter, we report only the marginal eects evaluated at the
mean of all explanatory variables in Table 5.
The main results reported in Tables 3-4 are based on samples that excluded cohorts born before 1950.
This strategy is motivated by a conservative approach to make sure that our results are not contaminated
by possible long-run eects of historical malaria on health and education. One can, however, plausibly
argue that the appropriate cut-o is 1947 if the goal is to exclude the cohorts that were potentially exposed
to historical malaria. To see if our results are sensitive to the cut-o year chosen, we report the estimates
using 1947 sample. The results in rst panel in Table 5 show that estimated coecient of land under
restrictions for dierent employment options are nearly identical to those reported in Table 4.
The non-agricultural activities are observed to concentrate around urban areas and areas with better
market access (Fachamps and Shilpi, 2003 and 2005). This spatial concentration is captured by the travel
time to urban center variable. Emran and Shilpi (2011) shows that size of the market is an important
35The marginal eects are estimated for 10 dierent quantiles of proportion of land under restrictions starting at lowest
10th quantile.
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determinant of location of activities in addition to just access to market. To see if our results are driven by
heterogeneity in the market size, we include an additional control: log of urban population within 5 hours
of travel time from the sub-district. The estimated eects of land restrictions on employment pattern is
nearly unchanged (panel 2, Table 5).
In the third robustness check, we explore if the results are driven by inclusion of the Western province
in our sample. A disproportionate share of manufacturing and skilled services activities are located in the
Western province where Sri Lanka's main city Colombo is located. This province also has much less land
under restrictions. The estimation results that included a dummy for the western province are shown in
the third panel of Table 5. A comparison with results in Table 4 shows clearly that though the estimated
coecients are somewhat smaller for all dierent options of employment, the overall results on the eect
of land restrictions on employment pattern remains remarkably unchanged in this case.
Finally, we check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the inclusion/exclusion of sub-districts
with very high incidence of land restrictions; are the estimates driven by a few outliers in the right tail?
The last panel of Table 5 reports the estimates from a sample that excludes sub-districts with proportion
of land under restrictions more than 30 percent. The restricted sample has 212 subdistricts and thus loses
30 out of a 242 subdistricts in the full sample. The estimated eects are similar to those in Table 4 with
one exception: the marginal eect (at mean values of all explanatory variables) of land restrictions on
probability of employment in manufacturing is no longer statistically signicant though it still has the
negative sign.
The results from the robustness checks are reassuring. Though the magnitudes of estimated coe-
cients change slightly, the overall conclusions about the impacts of land restrictions on the probability of
participation in non-agricultural activities remains unchanged.
5.4 Eects on Wage and Per Capita Consumption
In this section, we test whether the lower wages that result from land restrictions also aect household
consumption adversely. Table 6 reports the estimated eects of land market restrictions on log annual
wage and log per capita consumption. The IV results are based on a regression specication similar to
those reported in Tables 3-5. The estimate for wage shows clearly that the impact of land restrictions on
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local wage is negative and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. The elasticity estimate in column
2 (at mean) suggest that a one percentage point higher incidence of land restrictions from the mean level
(0.13) reduces wages by about 0.125 percent.36
The results on per capita consumption are consistent with a priori expectation that a lower wage rate
caused by higher incidence of land restrictions is likely to increase poverty. The coecient and the elasticity
estimates from IV results are reported in columns (3) and (4) respectively in Table 6. The estimated
coecient on the land restriction in per capita consumption regression is negative and signicant at the
10 percent level. The elasticity estimate implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the land under
restrictions starting from the mean (13 percent) reduces per capita consumption in a village by 0.084
percent. The results thus suggest that restrictions on sales and rental of land not only constrain the
structural change from agriculture to non-farm sector, they also reduce per capita household consumption,
and thus are likely to increase poverty.
5.5 Alternative Mechanisms: Collateral Value, Insecure Property Rights, or
Migration Costs?
The results presented and discussed above provide strong evidence that the land market restrictions ad-
versely aect participation in dierent types of non-agricultural activities signicantly. The eects of land
restrictions on the pattern of labor allocation are, however, consistent with not only the theoretical analysis
in section (3) above that identies rural-urban migration as the main channel through which the restrictions
work. As noted earlier in section (3), a declining share of non-farm employment following land restrictions
is also consistent with the predictions from the two other alternative mechanisms: credit channel and
guard labor requirements arising from insecurity of property rights. The theoretical analysis in section 3
provides a simple but convincing way to discriminate among dierent mechanisms at work. When labor
is not geographically mobile, a decline in access to credit due to lower collateral value of land will reduce
local wage, as the demand for labor is lower. On the other hand, insecurity of property rights implies a
negative shock to labor supply to the market as people stay at home to guard the property, leading to
36These estimates, although based on a dierent sample, are similar to the earlier estimates in Emran and Shilpi (forth-
coming).
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higher local wages. However, with mobile labor, local wage will remain nearly unchanged in either of these
cases. Before presenting the test based on local wages, we note that there is no direct restriction on mobility
of labor within Sri Lanka in contrast to some other countries such as China (Hukou) and Vietnam (Ho
Khau). Indeed, labor market in Sri Lanka has been characterized by considerable geographic mobility with
a large proportion of workers employed in manufacturing in cities (e.g. garments) coming from rural areas.
Data from census 2012 show that about 27 percent of population in two prominent destination districts
(Colombo and Gampaha) are migrants. About a fth of Sri Lanka's total population are migrants. This
evidence suggests substantial mobility of population within Sri Lanka.
With geographically mobile workers, the impact of land restrictions on local wage provides a credible
test of whether migration channel is indeed driving the results reported earlier: there should be a negative
eect on wages only if migration cost is the relevant channel. As discussed above, the estimates in Table 6
provide clear evidence of a negative eect of land restrictions on local wage, thus strongly reject both the
rights insecurity and collateral mechanisms. Note that a lower wage is not consistent with a labor supply
response to property rights insecurity, even when geographic mobility of labor is limited.
There are two additional pieces of evidence that contradicts the existence of a signicant collateral
and credit constraint eect. First, the evidence that land restrictions do not aect self-employment in
non-agriculture contradicts a collateral and credit eect, because a reduction in credit availability should
aect non-farm self-employment (entrepreneurship) the most. The second piece of evidence comes from
the fact that manufacturing is the most capital intensive among all of the sectors in our context. Thus a
decline in capital due to tighter credit constraint would mean a larger negative impact of land restrictions
on employment probability in manufacturing than services. The evidence discussed above suggests the
opposite, probability of employment in services declines by a larger magnitude than that in manufacturing.
Direct evidence on outmigration from villages also supports the conclusion that migration costs is the
mechanism mediating the eects of land restrictions. Taking advantage of the recently released migration
data at the district level from the 2012 population census, we plot outmigration rates against proportion
of land under restrictions in Figure 1. It is clear from Figure 1 that propensity of outmigration is lower in
areas with higher proportion of land under restrictions.
Taken together, all of the dierent pieces of evidence above suggest strongly that the negative eects of
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land restrictions on employment propensities in nonagricultural activities are driven primarily by increasing
migration costs due to restrictions on sales and rental of land in LDO areas.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the eects of sales and rental restrictions in the land market on structural change
from agriculture to non-farm employment in a rural economy. A growing body of economic literature
analyzes the eects of land restrictions on labor supply, focusing on property rights insecurity and credit
access as the relevant mechanisms. This paper on the other hand emphasizes the increased migration costs
due to a ban on land sales. We develop a theoretical model that identies the conditions under which
imposition of land restrictions can lead to an increase in the relative share of employment in agriculture,
resulting in a reverse structural change in the rural economy. Equally important, and consistent with the
analysis of Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming, 2015), the theoretical model shows that local wage will be lower
in a location with higher proportion of land under restrictions if migration cost is the main causal channel.
In contrast, if either access to credit or insecurity of property rights are the channels through which land
restrictions operate, then local wage should remain relatively unaected by land restrictions due to labor
mobility.
To provide estimates of the causal eect of land restrictions, we exploit a historical quasi-experiment
in Sri Lanka that allows us to use variations in malaria prevalence across districts from 13th to early 20th
centuries to identify the eects of land restrictions on employment choices. The marginal eects from
the control function approach to logit and multionomial logit models show that land restrictions reduce
the probability of participation in non-agriculture signicantly: a one percentage point increase in land
restrictions reduces the probability of participation in non-agriculture by 1.38 percent.
The more disaggregated empirical results show that land restrictions have negative and statistically
signicant eects on the probability of wage employment in manufacturing and services activities, but
a positive eect on the probability of being employed in agricultural wage work. The negative eect is
particularly large for services: a percentage point increase in land under restrictions decreases probability
of wage employment in services by 0.71 percent. We present evidence that land market restrictions reduce
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wage in the village labor market, and result in lower household per capita consumption. A 1 percentage
point increase in land under restrictions reduces per capita household consumption by 0.084 percent. We
provide a rich array of evidence that rejects collateral value and insecurity of property rights as relevant
mechanisms through which land restrictions aect employment choices and household consumption. The
evidence is strong that the eects are driven primarily by a higher migration costs due to restrictions
on sales and rental of land. The theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper thus has two important
contributions: (i) it shows that land market restrictions can result in a reverse structural change in the
rural economy, and lower per capita household consumption, and (ii) it allows us to discriminate among
three possible causal mechanisms, and provides clear evidence in favor of the migration costs channel which
has been relatively neglected in the recent development literature.
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Online Appendix A: Not for Publication
Wage Determination
We rst consider the case where the nonagricultural good is tradable. This simplies the algebra and help
focus on the role played by the migration costs in determining the wage in village labor market. The wage
determination in this case is the outcome of the local labor market clearing and the migration equilibrium
condition. We normalize the prices to 1, and ignore transport and other costs involved in trading at the
international market (we consider transaction costs below when nonagricultural good is assumed to be
nontradable).
Given a wage rate w, the demand for labor in dierent activities can be expressed as:
@Qf
@Lf
= w ) Lf = T

1  
w
 1

@Qn
@Ln
= w ) Ln = K

1  
w
 1

Denote the equilibrium wage at the initial equilibrium by w0. Then the local labor market clearing implies:
LS
 
w0

=
 1
h0
dF (h) = T

1  
w0
 1

+ K

1  
w0
 1

(10)
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Where LS (:) is the labor supply function to the village labor market, and h0 is the threshold value
such that all households h with distance to the urban center dh < dh0 decides to migrate. Denoting the
indirect utility functions in rural and urban areas by V r (:) and V u (:) respectively, the cut-o distance is
determined from the following migration equilibrium condition:
V u (Th0 ; w
u; 1; 1)  ' (dh0) = V r
 
Th0 ; w
0; 1; 1

(11)
where migration cost faced by a household is heterogeneous and increasing in its distance to the urban
market dh and land owned by the household is an argument in the indirect utility function at urban location
because a household can sell the land take the money with them when migrating in the absence of any
sales restrictions. Equations (10) and (11) jointly determine the equilibrium values of w0 and h0 in the
initial equilibrium without any land restrictions.
We are now ready to consider the eects of land restrictions on the local labor market equilibrium. The
rst thing to note is that given the initial equilibrium wage w0, for a household dh > dh0 the imposition of
land restrictions has no eect on its migration decision, as they do not migrate irrespective of whether there
are restrictions on land sales. However, under land restrictions; a household with dh  dh0 might nd it no
longer protable to migrate, because they lose the land when migrating. Note that the households at a given
distance dier in terms of land endowment and thus the costs they incur when migrating is heterogeneous.
We can thus consider the migration decisions conditional on distance for the subset of households that
nds migration desirable without land restrictions. Fix a distance d^h < dh0 . The migration equilibrium
condition given d^h is given as follows:
V u (0; wu; 1; 1)  '

d^h

= V r

Th j d^h

; w0; 1; 1

(12)
What equation (12) shows is that even though all households at distance d^h would choose to migrate without
land restrictions, but those with land more than a threshold Th > Th stay back in the village after the
imposition of land restrictions. In fact at any given distance dh < dh0 there will be some households with
enough land that they nd it undesirable to migrate after the imposition of land restrictions. This increases
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the supply of labor in the local labor market and drives down the equilibrium wage.
When the nonagricultural good is a nontradable, the equilibrium is characterized by local market
clearing of nonagricultural good along with the labor market clearing and migration equilibrium condition.
We discuss the market clearing in non-tradable nonagriculture below. A simple way to model nontradability
of the nonfarm good is that its equilibrium price in the local market falls in the transaction cost band. We
assume that nonagricultural good is imported to the urban area from world market and its price in the
urban market is normalized to 1. A unit of nonagricultral good requires n transport costs to bring it to
the village market.37 The nonagriculture is nontradable because its local price Pn 2 (1; 1 + n). Denoting
the equilibrium prices before ad after land restrictions as Pn0 and Pn respectively, we have the following
migration equilibrium conditions:
V u (Th0 ; w
u; 1; 1)  ' (dh0) = V r
 
Th0 ; w
0; 1; Pn0

V u (0; wu; 1; 1)  '

d^h

= V r

Th j d^h

; w0; 1; Pn

Employment Choices and Labor Allocation Under Land Restrictions: The Case
of Nontradable Non-farm Good
(a) Labor Allocation with Income elasticity of demand for nonagricultural goods greater than or equal to
unity :
We consider the case where wage is given w andf > 0 and n = 0: The demand for nonagricultural
good can be dened as:
Cn =
n
Pn
[Y   f ]
Total village income consists of agricultural income (Y f = Qf ) and non-agricultural income (Y n =
PnQn): Setting demand for non-agricultural good to its supply:
37For simplicity, we ignore trading costs for agriculture. Alternatively, one can normalize the trading costs inclusive price
to 1.
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PnCn = PnQn = n[Y   f ] = n[Qf + PnQn   f ]
PnQn =
n[Q
f   f ]
1  n =) (P
n)1= =
n[ T (1  )(1 )=w( )=   fw(1 )= ]
(1  n) K(1  )(1 )=
The employment ratio can be derived as:
Cn =
n
Pn
[Y   f ]
Snf =
(1  )1= Kw( )=(Pn)1=
(1  )1= T =
n(1  )
(1  n)(1  ) [1 
fw(1 )=
(1  )1 = T ] (13)
Equation (13) can be used to examine the impact of land restrictions on the ratio of nonagriculture to
agricultural employment. From equation (13), it is seen easily that
@snf
@w < 0:
Note also that if f = 0; the utility function becomes homothetic (Cobb-Douglas in this case). In this
homothetic case, it follows from equation (13) that
@snf
@w = 0: In other words, with homothetic preference,
the relative employment shares of nonagriculture and agriculture remains unaected by land restrictions
(proposition 2(ii)).
(b) Labor Allocation with Income inelasticity of demand for nonagricultural goods:
This case is represented by the following restrictions on subsistence quantities: f = 0 and n > 0: The
demand for nonagricultural good can now be described as:
Cn = (1  n)n + nYk
Pn
The equilibrium price for nonagricultural good can be determined from the following equilibrium con-
dition:
(1  n)Pn[Qn   n] = nQf
Pn(1=) K(1  )(1 )=w( )=
(1  )1 = T  
Pnnw(1 )=
(1  )1 = T =
n
(1  n) (14)
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Since equation (14) is non-linear in Pn; it cannot be solved directly. Instead dene the following system
of equations:
Snf   (1  )
1= Kw( )=(Pn)1=
(1  )1= T = 0
(1  )
(1  )Snf  
Pnnw(1 )=
(1  )1 = T =
n
(1  n)
Taking partial derivatives and expressing it in matrix form, we have the following system which can be
solved to nd out how snf and P
n change in response to wage:
264 1   snfPn
(1 )
(1 )   z1Pn
375
264 @snf
@Pn
375 =
264 ( )snfw
(1 )z1
w
375 @w
We dene z1 =
Pnnw(1 )=
(1 )1 = T and z2 =
z1Snf
w
. The response of employment ratio to wage can be solved
as:
@Snf
@w
=
(1  ) z2
(1 )
(1 )Snf   z1
> 0
The numerator is unambiguously positive. The denominator is positive because (1 )(1 )Snf   z1 >
(1 )
(1 )Snf   z1 = n(1 n) > 0:Thus ratio of employment in nonagriculture to agriculture changes positively
with wage and hence negatively with the proportion of land under restrictions.
Online Appendix B: Not for Publication
Land Market Restrictions in Sri Lanka: Historical Background
The present day land tenure system in Sri Lanka is largely an outcome of colonial laws and its subse-
quent amendments. During the early colonial period, the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance of 1840
transferred all lands without private title|unoccupied or uncultivated land (abandoned due to malaria),
forests and waste land{ to the state. As a result of this Ordinance, the British Crown became the owner
of nearly all lands, as landownership in Sri Lanka was governed by local customs and few in the peasantry
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possessed clear formal titles (De Silva,1981; Peebles, 2006). Between 1840 and 1870, Crown land suitable
for coee plantation were purchased rapidly by British ocials and investors as well as some wealthy Sri
Lankans.38 After the complete demise of coee crop due to leaf disease by 1875, plantations diversied into
other crops such as tea, rubber etc. The expansion of plantations on the basis of Crown lands subsided by
the 1920s.39 The point to emphasize here is that purchase of Crown lands by private individuals/plantation
owners during the late 19th and early 20th century was driven by suitability of land for coee production,
a crop which had virtually disappeared from Sri Lanka.40
The Land Development Ordinance (LDO for short) of 1935 initiated a program of making Government-
owned agricultural land available for private household use. The state introduced a system of protected
tenure under which recipients of LDO land had the right to occupy and cultivate the land in perpetuity
subject to restrictions imposed on sale, leasing and mortgaging, and conditions related to abandoning or
failing to cultivate the land. While subsequent amendments have weakened some conditions on mortgage
(now allowed for loans from public banks) and limited transferability (with special permission from the
government which was uncommon during the period covered by the survey), the basic provisions of unitary
succession and ban on subdivision and sales of plots and land rental remain largely intact (see Peebles,
2006; De Silva, 1981; World Bank, 2008 for the history of land reforms). Distribution of LDO land took
place mainly after Sri Lanka's Independence in 1948 and much of the land was distributed under various
settlement schemes. The settlement schemes brought landless Sinhalese people from the relatively malaria-
free south to the historically malaria infested DSDs in the dry zone. The LDO leases today coexist with
complete private holding in the same location (World Bank, 2008). The share of land under LDO leases
varies signicantly across areas in our sample (the maximum is 63 percent and minimum 0.2 percent) which
is critical for estimation of the eect of LDO restrictions on equilibrium wages.
38Peebles (2006) states that land in Kandyan hills were particularly suitable for coee plantation. This land was reclaimed
from the Kandyan peasantry regardless of the status of their titles and was to be sold to plantation owners later on.
39The larger plantations were nationalized during the early 1970s, and are now run by private companies under long-term
lease arrangements with the government.The importance of plantation crops in Sri Lankan economy today has also declined
substantially with an increasing share of land going to paddy and other eld crops. Indeed, the estate/plantation sector now
accounts only for 5.5 percent of Sri Lanka's population in 2006. Only 8.6 percent of our sample comes from estate/plantation
areas. We use a dummy for estate sector in our regressions.
40The coee land (hilly land) are not necessarily considered as particularly suitable for paddy and other eld crops which
are now the mainstay of Sri Lanka's smallholder agriculture.
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Table 1: Relationship between historical malaria and current productivity (yield) 
  Rice Banana 
Ground 
Nut 
Other 
Oilseeds 
Proportion of Area Under 
LDO 1,589** -1,645 843.5*** -314.1 
 
(2.336) (-1.095) (3.007) (-0.236) 
R-squared 0.199 0.080 0.285 0.069 
Historical Malaria Incidence -2.546 -18.03 -0.00790 -15.65 
 
(-0.350) (-1.658) (-0.00254) (-1.432) 
R-squared 0.170 0.088 0.100 0.088 
Observations 118 98 57 101 
Regressions control for average rainfall, slope, current malaria incidence and dummy for within 5km of a river.  
Robust t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Source: Emran 
and Shilpi (forthcoming) 
Table 2: Land under Restrictions, Historical Malaria and Health Status 
 
Anemia among non-pregnant women 
% suffering Chronic 
Illness/disability 
  Mild/Moderate Severe Any Male Female All 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -34.726 0.459 -34.164 -7.264 7.000 -3.421 
  (1.79)* (0.38) (1.81)* (1.39) (0.51) (0.47) 
Historical Malaria Incidence -1.181 -0.045 -1.203 -0.134 0.071 -0.085 
  (1.21) (0.77) (1.26) (0.51) (0.11) (0.24) 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at village level 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Source: Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming) 
 
Table 3: Employment Choice and Land Restrictions: Probit and Multinomial Logit Results 
 
Non-Farm Self-employ. Wage employment in 
  Employment 
Non-
Agriculture Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
 
(Marginal Effects)  (Marginal effects) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -0.527*** -0.0819 0.148* -0.174*** -0.205* 
 
(-5.174) (-1.285) (1.750) (-3.460) (-1.749) 
 
(Probit Coefficients) ( Multinomial Logit Coefficients) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -1.451*** -3.006*** -1.592*** -3.511*** -2.937*** 
  (-5.174) (-4.342) (-2.821) (-6.245) (-5.111) 
Controls 
     Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,948 8,948 8,948 8,948 8,948 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity and a full set of 
area controls including travel time to cities, disease environment, land and labor productivity indicators and ethnic composition. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4: Employment Choice and Land Restrictions: Control functions Results 
  Non-Farm Self-employ. Wage employment in 
  Employment Non-Agriculture Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
 
(Marginal Effects)  (Marginal effects) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -1.382*** -0.147 0.594*** -0.424** -0.713*** 
 
(-5.094) (-0.950) (2.593) (-2.450) (-2.589) 
 
(Probit 
Coefficients) ( Multinomial Logit Coefficients) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -3.817*** -6.430*** -2.037 -8.032*** -7.185*** 
  (-5.094) (-3.721) (-1.197) (-4.183) (-4.821) 
First stage Regressions 
     Malaria 0.00354*** 
  (4.950) 
Relevance of Instruments 
     Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist-Pischke F 24.5 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 
Controls 
     Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,948 8,948 8,948 8,948 8,948 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity and a full set of 
area controls including travel time to cities, disease environment, land and labor productivity indicators and ethnic composition. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 5: Employment Choice and Land Restrictions: Robustness of Control functions Results 
  Non-Farm Self-employ. Wage employment in 
  Employment Non-Agri. Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1947+ sample  (Marginal effects) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -1.436*** -0.164 0.577*** -0.421** -0.760*** 
  (-5.314) (-1.070) (2.581) (-2.510) (-2.811) 
Population within 5 hrs of travel 
time  
     Proportion of Area Under LDO -1.510*** -0.132 0.657*** -0.488*** -0.791*** 
  (-5.512) (-0.951) (2.891) (-3.214) (-2.924) 
Controlling for Western province 
     Proportion of Area Under LDO -1.225*** -0.141 0.442* -0.429** -0.558** 
  (-4.478) (-0.940) (1.947) (-2.310) (-1.976) 
Restricted sample: proportion LDO<0.3 
    Proportion of Area Under LDO -2.904*** -0.464 1.535** -0.409 -1.821** 
  (-4.069) (-1.330) (2.526) (-0.744) (-2.526) 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity and a full set of 
area controls including travel time to cities, disease environment, land and labor productivity indicators and ethnic composition. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 6: Land market restrictions and wages  
 
Log(Real 
Annual Log (real per capita 
  wage) household expenditure) 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -0.964** -0.644* 
  (-2.164) (-1.794) 
First stage- regressions 
  Historical Malaria 0.00307*** 0.00346*** 
  (4.420) (4.795) 
Relevance of Instruments 
  Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist-Pischke F 19.72 22.99 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 9.08 
Individual/head’s characteristics Yes Yes 
Household characteristics Yes Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes 
Observations 6,428 11,091 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity and a full set of 
area controls including travel time to cities, disease environment, land and labor productivity indicators and ethnic composition. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Land Market Restrictions and Out-migration
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Proportion of Area Under LDO 
Leases 0.13 0.07 0.14 
Travel Time to Large City (hour) 2.65 2.00 2.43 
Female Wage (annual in rupees) 60578 49263 51670 
Malaria incidence (spleen rate) 23.23 12.20 20.97 
P.Vivax (1000) 0.05 0.01 0.12 
P.Fac. (1000) 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Share of Sinhalese in population 0.86 0.92 0.19 
Rainfall (milimetre) 2411 2269 819 
Slope (%) 10.65 7.23 9.03 
River within 5 km (yes=1) 0.34 0.00 0.47 
Age (Year) 34.62 34.00 9.12 
Education Level (year) 8.35 10.00 3.45 
Married (yes=1) 0.71 1.00 0.45 
Christian (yes=1) 0.05 0.00 0.22 
Muslim (yes=1) 0.05 0.00 0.21 
Buddist (yes=1) 0.82 1.00 0.38 
Moor (yes=1) 0.05 0.00 0.21 
Tamil (yes=1) 0.09 0.00 0.29 
Estate (yes=1) 0.09 0.00 0.29 
 
